lcndtng In ,mail firm finance It exammes pnce and nonpnce term" of bank hne, of cred,t (Lies) extended to ,mall firm" The foeu\ on Lie" dllows the examInatIOn of a type of loan contract m whIch the bankborrower relatlOo<;hlP IS lIkely to be dO Importdnt mecham"ffi for solvmg the d~ymmetnc mformatlon problem" associated WIth findncmg small enterpfl<;cs We find that borrower" WIth longer bankmg reIdtlOnshIp, PdY lower mtere~t rates and are Ie" lIkely to pledge collateral fhese re'iults are con'ilstent wlth theoretIcal drgument, that relatlOn<;hlp lendmg other eVidence of relatIOnship lendmg was found m the firm's trade credit arrangements Our analy"s IS similar to thIS second strand at the empmcal lIterature m that we focm on the duratIOn at the bank-borrowel relationship as a mcasure of ItS strength We abo share With these studieS a focus on small, mostly untraded firms for which the bank-borrower rc\allon-ship IS hkely to be Important ThiS differs from the bank-umqueness studies, which generally concentrated on large, pubhcly traded firms that may be less dependent on bankmg relatIOnships Our study and the Petersen and Rajan (1993, 1994 ) studIes also share a thlfd advantage over the bank-UnIqueness studies We are able to test dlfectly the predlcllons of thc recent theoretical models of relatlOmhlp lendmg about the path of loan mterest rates over the course of the bankborrower relatIonshIp Our approach, however, dIffers from the Petersen and Rajan (1993, 1994 ) studIes m two Important ways First, we focus exclUSIvely on lendmg under Lies The Lie " an attractIve vehicle for studymg the bank-bon ower lelatlOnshlp because the Lie Itself represents a formal-!latton of thIS relatlonshlp By IImltmg our study to Lies, we exclude from our data set most loans that are "transactlOn-dnven" rather than "relatIOnship-driven" and may thus aVOId dllutmg our rclattonshlp lendmg resulb Second, we analyze the empmcal a5'OCldtton between relatIOnship lendmg and the collateral deCISIOn, provldmg the first test of Boot and Thakor's (1994) theorettcal predlcttons about collateral and the first analYSIS of the pdttern of collateral reqUirements over ttme We also test some proposlttons from the collateral lIterature about the assoctatlons among collateral, borrower fisk, and loan nsk Our data are drawn from the National Survey of Small Busmess Fmances (NSSBF), which contams extensive mformatlon on both borrowers and loan contracts, as well as mformatton on the relatIOnship between the bank and the borrower By way of preView, we find that borrowers With longer bankmg relallonshlps pay lower mterest rates and are less lIkely to pledgc collateral These findmgs arc both stattsttcally and economically slgmficant despite relatIvely low R 2 s and generally m"gmficant coeffictents of the control vanables Our relationship lendmg findmgs are con"stent With the lheorettcal predictions of Petersen and Rajan (1993) and Boot and Thakor (1994) and supporllhe mOle general theorettcal hterature on the role of banks a~ mformatlOn producer~ OUI results arc aho con~lstcnt With much whIch are more likely to re1lect I elatlOn,hlp cf1cch thdn dre othel loans AdditIOnal eVIdence to 'uppo, t th" attnbJltJ('" " plescnted below
The drtlcle " orgamzed as follows SectIOn II J"clh,es the extant hteraturc on reldllamh", lendIng Sec lion III descnbes thc data set and mottvdte.., the vanahles used In thE' dnJ]y";;15 SectIOn IV ple"ent~ OUf econometnc tests of the detciffilOdtlon of the 10dn fAte dnd whcthet collateral IS pledged, both a, funetllll" of the strength of the b,mkborrower relatIOn~hlp dnd other vanqhlc", SrcttvD V cOlhJudcs the dIscussIOn
II The Relallonshlp Lendmg LIterature
The mformatlOn-bd..,ed literature on financldl IOtcrmedldtlOn (e g Diamond 1984 , Rdmakmhnan and Thakor 198.1, Boyd and Prescott 1986 ,uggesb that financial mtelmedMrlCS eXISt because they enJoy economle~ of scale and/or comp8fdJIve ddvdntdgc'S 1t1 the productIOn of mformatlOn ahout bOlfower5 Banks In partJCulal ",pccldhLe In lendmg to d highly tnfOrmatlOn-problematlc cld..,.., of horrowu.., Because of thIS specwlJ7atJOn, contractmg In the bdnk 10dn market appea" to dIffer ,ubstantlally trom contractmg in other major debt ,ndrkets (sec Carey, PIOWSC, Rea and Udell 1993) One kdture ofttn dscnbed ta commcrcml bank lendmg " It, emph"Sls all relatIOnshIp 'cndmg , Bank, may acqUIre mfOi matlon through the rciatromh,p by momtorlng borrmA(er performance ovel time undcr Cled!t drrdngcmcnt.., dnd/Ol through the prOVISion of other ... crVlrc.., ..,uch d ... dep0..,it rlLcounh (.,ee Allen, Saunders, and Udell 1991, Nakdmllrd 1993) , banks may then use this mformatIOn m de~lgmng futUi e CI edit contraU.., Some ~tudlC~ hdve ..,pectficdlly modeled the ~l"~OclatJOn between the length of the bank-borrowc, I elatJ(ln,hlp dlld the pncmg of loan, In an extemlOn of Dlamand (1989) , Petersen and RaJan (1993) developed a theoretical model wllh both advel,c selection alJd 'noral hazard m which banks offer hIgher rates m the nl q pCrlod, when bon ower type, arc unknown, and then reduce fatc~ In leiter p~flod<., ()fter borrower types have been revealed Boot and Thakor (1994) dem01"trated that the duration of the hank-borrower lcldhon"hlp may hI..-!lllportant 111 determlOmg loan pnce~ even In ct model WIthout a learnm!l component They also found that collateral reqllJrement, arc rdated to the length ot the rclatlOn~hlp Borrower~ pay a high I ate dod pledge collateral early Iil the relatIOnshIp, they then pay a lower rate and do not pledge colJdtcrdl IdteI III the reldtlOIlshlP after they hdvc demOn'itrdted ..,ome project suc(.,e~~ The Petersen and Ra]an (1993) and Boot and Thakor (1994) models stand m contrast to other theones Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989) , Sharpe (1990), and Wilson (1993) all demonstrated condillons under which lenders SubSidiLe borrowers m early penods and are reimbursed for th" SUbSidy m later penods Thus, thc iSsue of the associatIOn between loan pncmg and the length of the bank-borrower relatiOnship is uillmately an empmcal one In additIOn, as noted above, no One has prevIOusly tes ted the empmcal associallon between collateral and the length of the bank-borrower relatIOnship
The bank LlC is a parllcularly Important part of relationship lendmg because it represents a forward commitment to provide workmg capital financmg under pre speCified terms 2 It is not surpnsmg therefore, that much of the empmcal literature on bank umqueness has focused on bank LlCs James (1987) found posillve abnormal returns aSSOCiated with announcements of firms who were granted bank LlCs Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Wansley, Elayan, and Collins (1992) found eVidence that James's results were dnven by LlC renewals as opposed to newly imllated LlCs ThiS result is conSIStent With the notIOn that mformalJon about the borrower IS acqUired over lime through the bank-borrower relatIOnship and IS reflected In the contmuallon of credit arrangements, as opposed to imtlal credit assessments Billett et al (1995) , however, found no difference In the announcement effects between new and renewal LlCs 3 One explanatIOn for these disparate results may be that the new-renewal bmomml categonzatlOn of LlCs is at best a weak measure of the strength of the relatIOnship As In Petersen and Ra]an (1993, 1994) , we aVOId thiS measurement problem by usmg the contmuous duratIOn of the bank-borrower relatIOnship as a measure of its strength Also, unlike the umquene;s event studies that focus pnmanly on large, pubbcly traded firms, we use data on small mostly untraded firms, whIch tend to be much more bank dependent Petersen and Ra]an (1993, 1994 ) also used the NSSBF data source to analyze relatIOnship lendmg and found somewhat confllctmg results As m th" artICle, they used the length of the bank-borrower relatIOnship as a measure of Its strength They found no statistical assocJallon 2 Mo<;t Lies contam matenal adver,>e change (MAC) cl<lllc,ec, that permit the bank to abrogate the commitment If the borrower'~ financldl condition haS changed ~ubstantldlly However, these c1ause~ can on I) be contmgent on venfiable characten~tlc~ of the borrower In dddltlOn, hecause of reputdtlOn effecb and lender hdbllity ldw<;, bank~ may be rciuddnt to Invoke the~e c1au<;e., except under exlleme conditIons (see Avery and Berger 1991) between the ,trength of the bank-borrowcl relallOnslllp and bu"ne" loan pnelllg III lhen 1994 paper (they dId not IIlcludc the length of the bank-borrower relatlon,hlp III the loall pllcrng equation In thell 1993 paper) However, they dId find eVIdence of a lc',er dependence on trade credIt by firms with longer bankmg reldllon,hlps, whIch supports the value of reiallOnshlp lendmg Pclc"en dnd RdJan', faIlure to find eVIdence of feldtlon,llIp lendmg III bank loan pncmg whIch I un' countcr to our findlllg' below, may be atlnbutdble 10 thclI melu'lOn at all type, of external 10dns In thell data set rather than focll,lIlg on iMnk LlC, 4 lhat ", they lllcluded a numbel of dIfferent type, of loans for whIch reput?llon and relatIonshIp effects may be sllb,tantlally Ie" un pOi tant than tho,e a"ocrated WIth the forward eommllment embodIed III all Lie Th"se non-Lie loans lllciuJe mortgages, eqUIpment 10dn" motor vehIcle 10dl1' , dnd other spot loans, mdny of whIch mdY be one-time loans or loan, for nonrecurring credIt need, In the pdflance of Wall Street, these loans tend to he "tran"actlOn-dnven" ratht'f thdn "rclatlOn'ihlp-dnvcn " Thus, the loan pncmg effect of relatIOnships may have been dIluted by the mciuslOn of these I(MIlS III theIr sample, In contra,t, we "mIt our analys" to only loan, drawn under LlCs '
III. The Data Set
The NSSBP prOVides more cxten~lve mformal'on on mdlvldual ..,mall bllslllesses than does any other pubhcly dVdllable ,ource rhe survey wa, conducted III 1988-89 by the Federal Reserve Board and the Small BUSlIlc>s Admml,tratlOn (SEA) rhe data were obl,ullca by telephone mtervlCW~ WIth executive.., of ab{)ut 3,400 bU"imc..,,,e~ Lach mterview consl~ted of about 200 questIOn'S c(}vcnng firm dcscnptlOll, governance, hl'itory, u..,e of credIt, relatIOnship", WIth financldl m<.,t1tutIOns, dnd balance sheet dnd income mtormdtion I he rc'Spondenh rcpI ~..,ent a strdtlfied random sample, by SlLe dnd geography, offor-profit, Ilonagncultural nonfinancIal firms ApprOXlm,tlely 80~ of the ,ample had less than 50 employee" 10% hdd 51-100 employee, and 10% had 101-500 employees Nearly all of the firm, were pnvately o,,"ed-·-only about 5% were publicly traded Asset SlLe ranged up to $219 million The geographical reprc~entatlon Wd~ abo i clatlvely unlfOi m WIth about 25% each from the northea,tern, n", th centl al southern, and we"tern ",tatc~ Table I de,cnbe, the vanablcs used 10 this study, broken down mto five mam categones LlC contract charactemtlcs, firm financial charactenstlc';;, firm governance chdractenstlcs, mdustry charactenshcs, and mformahon/relatlOnshlp charactenstlcs Lookmg fi"t at the contract LharaUfllstl(S of commercial LlCs, PREM IS the premIUm over tbe pnme rate at which loans drawn under the LlC are pnced,' COLLAT mdlcatcs whether the LlC IS secured, which IS further decomposed by type of secunty-ARINV for accounts receivable and/ or mventory, and OTHERSEC for all other secunty, mcludmg eqUipment, real estate, and personal asset, of the owner;
The dl,tmcllon between ARINV and OTHERSEC IS Important to the analys" Prachhoner; tend to vIew LlCs secured by accounts receIVable and mventory as the nsklest type ofworkmg capItal financmg, and so PREM may be expected to be hIgher for the,e loans to compensate the bank for thIS nsk Perhaps more Important for analYLmg relatIOnship lcndmg, ARINV financmg or "asset-based lendmg" generally mvolves a form of mten,e momtonng not associated With other type, of loans ThIS type of momtonng, whIch mcludes observatIOn of ,ales mVOlcmg dnd Inventory management, may produce valuable mformahon about overall firm performance as well as mformallon about the value of the collateral (Swary and Udcll 1988) Such mformatlOn may be parhcularly valuable for young firms early m theIr bank-borrower relatIOnshIps when there IS substantial uncertamty about their ablhhe, to repay loans If so, ARINV financmg may mvolve the bank acqumng more mformahon per year through the relatIOnship than IS customary WIth other types of loan, and usmg thIS mformatlOn to deSIgn future loan contrach The mcluslOn of different types of collateral dlstmgUlshes our article from prevIOus studies of busmess lendmg 7 6 One element of the pm.e vector about "'hlCh \\Ie do not h.1ve dat.1 I~ the LlC fee Pre,,>uffi.1bly, PREM IS less than It otherWise would be becau~e the b.1nk recelve~ <;orne compematlOn from fee Income Thl<; cOlild create d hlas If the fees VdTV sy~temattc.1lly With the char.1denstJ(..~ of the mdlvldudl bOTTower~ used dS exogenou<; vanable<; We do not expect thiS omISSion to create ,>ubstantJal bld~, however, Slllce mo~1 of any systematic vanatlOn to fee~ would hkely be related 10 the poliCIes of the bank rather theiO to the chardden~tlL"> of the mdIVldu.11 borrower~ 7 A further dl~hnctlon can be made between "lll~lde ' collateral (a~set<; of the borrowmg firm) and "out<;lde ' collateral (.1s~et<; oUblde the firm belongmg to eIther the owner of the firm or another mterested pJ.rty, such as a rndJor customer of the hrm) InSide coiJateral reorder~ the claims of credItors, whereas outSide coUater ... ! provlde~ addltlOndl asset<; for the ~ecurcd credltor~ to claim The theoretlcdl models m the literature generally focus on outSIde collateDI, WIth the exceptJOn of Swary and Udell (1988) Unfortunately, data hmltatlon"> prevent a c1e.1n dl~tmctlOn between mSlde and out">lde collaterdl <;mce the NSSBF ,,>uney focu<;ed on the type of asset pledged rather than ItS owner,,>hlp Nonetheless, ..... e may conclude that ARINV IS almo<;t surely all mSlde collateral, although OTHER~EC lIkely mdllde~ many ('.1':!e<; of both mSlde and ollt~lde collaterdl It IS .11<;0 mtere"tmg to note that the S8A recently announced a new IOdn program that, for the fint hme WIJl proVIde a govetnment gU.1r.1ntee for LlC" secured by ARI"NV Ihl<; IS a <;lgmfiLant departure for the SBA which prevlOu~ly had ~uh<;tantlally hmlted the scope of ItS guarantees to amortIZIng term loans Some lender<; hdve expressed The dummy varIable GUAR md,catc, whether the Lie IS guardnteed Guarantee~ are generally provided by the firm', owne" and give the lender recour.;;e agdln.;;t the owner.;; for any defiuency In payment con<..ern about th~ ne'A pIOgrdm b~cduse of tJ~~--~;lt~-n~e "lOnltOfwh d<;"ocJatcd wIth ARINV and becau<;e ot the per<..elved mkme~" of ttll" tyre of <;ecl1led lendmg (~cl/ 1994) by the bOITOWIng firm Guarantees are 51mllar to the pledgmg of personal collateral, although they do not Involve specific hem The dummy COMPBAL mdlcates whether the LlC has a compensatmg balance reqUirement
The jznanual (hwu<lensllu of the firm con"st of key financial raltos, including the leverage ratIO (LEV), the current rallo (CURRAT), the qUlck ralto (QUICKRAT) accounts receivable turnover (AR-TURN), Inventory turnover (INVTURN), accounts payable turnover (APTURN), and total asseh (TA) The purpose of the financial vanabIes [s to control for the observable fISk of the bOi rower m our regressIOns that determme the loan I ate and whether collateral" pledged It [s e~pected that all else equal, nskler bOi rowers would pay higher loan rates and pledge collateral mOre frequently, and pnor empmcal analys" " conSl'tent with these expectatIOns (e g , Udell 1990, 1992) Most of the finanCIal raltos are among the ratIOs conventIOnally used In credIt nsk analysIS and so should correspond reasonably well to the data used by banks In makmg theIr loan rate and collateral deCISIOns
The governance ,haraclemtlLI mclude the legal form of the firm CORP for (non-Subchapter S) cOlporatlOn, SUBS for Subchapter S corporatIOn, PART tor pal tnershlp, and PROP for sole propnetorslup, OWNMG mdlcates whether the firm was owner managed, and CONC50 Slgmfies whcthel 50% or more was owned by a "ngle famIly The governance chaJactenshcs arc mcluded because different ownershIp structu[es may be related to the amount of pnvate mformatlOn that borrowers bave, the nsks that borrowers take, and the abilIty of borrowers to shift nsk to the bank and other fixed-claIm holders All of these factors should figure In the determInatIOn of loan rates and collateral reqUIrements Indus/! y ,hm actensllu are reflected m dummy vanables for whethel the firm IS m the con,trucllon (CONSTR), services (SER-VICES), or retail (RETAIL) 1I1du,tnes The bulk of the remalOlOg respondents (OTHERIND) were m the manu[actunng sector AgalO, these vanabJes are mcluded because they may help proxy for mk m our equatIOns that determme the loan rate and the probab[hty of collateral helOg pledged
The informatIOn/relatIOnship chalUctellltlu consISt of AGE and RELATE The vanable AGE refers to the numbcr of years that current ownership has been In place If the firm IS currently owned by ItS founders, then AGE represents the actual age of the film The vanable RELATE IS the numbel of years that the firm has conducted buslOess WIth Its current lender dnd represents our measure of the strength of the bank-borrower relatlOnsh[p 8 The purpose of RELATE IS to cap-ture the ahlllty of the bank to ledrn more about the borrowmg firm through the bank-bon ower relatIOnshIp There h an "npOitant d"tmctlOn between AGE and RELATE AGE reflecI' mformatlOn that become'3 reyedled to the market a'3 d whole-that I"', d firm'.., public reputatIOn-whIle RELATE refiect' pnvate InformatIOn revedled thlOugh the mtermedlatl()n ploces; only to the lende, through the bank-borrower relatIonshIp Thu" the dIfference between AGE and RELATE e"enUally con esponds to the d"tmulon between reputatIOn and momtorIng m DIamond (1991) The '"e ()f both AGE and RELATE also may help d"tmgUl,h the role of hank loan, ve"us publIc debt offenng' It would be expected that AGE would have an effect m publIc malkets but that RELAIE would not ..,mec the Investor.., who buy publIc I'3SUC\ do not galll accc~.., to exc!u':.lve mfOimatlon from momtonng Il1 the ",arne way the'lt bank ... do Thus, our mam relatIonshIp test, at whether RELATL hd' effcct, on PREM and on the probabIlIty of COLLAT may al,o be vIewed as tests of the 'pecIalne" or UnIquene" ot bank, As noted earlIer, RELATE IS al,o lIkely to be a better mea,ure of the strength of the bank-bOlrower relatIOnshIp than the dl,tmctIOn bet"een new a"d renewal LlC, u,ed In Lummer and McConnell (1989) , W.mslcy, Elayan, and CollIns (1992), and BIllett, flannery, ami Garhnkel (1995) Although we are pnmanly mterested In the effects ot RbLA TE, It " Importdnt to mclude AGE In the analy,lS as a control vanable to aVOId bras, smce AGE and RELATE are so hIghly correlated (p ~ 476)
In the empmcal tables below, we report the rcsult, of rcgre",ons In whIch we 'peclfy the natural log, of AGio and RELATE-LNAGE and LNRELA TE, respectIvely Th" allows tor the pOSSIbIlIty ot d,-IluDlshmg margmal effed~ of addItional years III hU~lllc",,,, or 10 a rcldtlOn':>hlp on the Value of Information g,uned ThJ.t 1"1 we expect that the margmal effect of the fifth ye.u of AGE or RELATE to be more Import"nt In revealIng mformatlOn about the til m than the twenty-fifth year, by wh1ch tIme vIrtually all of the mfonllatlon that" gOIng to be revedled ha~ been revedled As dl..,cu~"ed below, we di.;;;o run robustne" check, WIth AGE and RELATE measured m levels rather than logs, and WIth ,econd-order terms 1Il both the logs and the level>
The medns of the val\able, for the enllfe sample of 863 firm, who reported LlCs are ,hown III the first column of tdble 2 1 hese means reveal scvcldl Illtere~tlDg Ch.lldctenstlc~ of <.,mctJl fllm ... usmg L/e\ rhe va>;t mdJol1ty are owner managed (89Q7c) With a ~lTIgle fdlmly ownmg more thdn half of the stock (SO'X) Mo,; are abo orgdlllled as non-Subchapter S cOrpOtdtJons (550/) COll"stcnt with other data sources the maJonty of the lICs are secured (53%) u,ually WIth accounts lecelvable and mventory (360/,) Only 7% at all L IC, In the sample have compensatmg balance reqUJJ emcnh ,uggeqmg thdt thIS pncmg element no longer pldY'" a promment rok for 'imall film"! The We also splIt the sample roughly m half between firms wIth a"ets above and below ~500,000 As shown In columns 2 and 3 of table 2, the d~ta suggest that firms WIth a"ets greater than ~500,OOO may be qUIte dIfferent from smaller firms In that they are much more lIkely to be corporalIons, they are much more lIkely to pledge collateral, they generally have lower lIqUIdIty ralIos and lower profit margInS, and they tend to pay a lower PREM The data also show that firms WIth assets above $500,000 are about 5 years older on average than firms WIth assets below $500,000, and have bank-borrower relatIOnshIps that are about 25 years longer on average We emphaSIze that ~)OO,OOO In assets IS qUIte small, and that our subsamples above and below thIS threshold should both be conSIdered small films 
A Loan Rate Te\!\
We pelform empIrIcal te::,h, fir..,t Oil loan 1.11...,., dnd then on collatcial OUf 10dn Jate te~t\ dDdlYIC the deteJrr,!p,mh of PR!-.M the 10dJ1 rdte premIUm ovcr the bdnk''') PIlI1lC r..lte PRf'M \'1 r~f'J,--...,..,(.d on the loarl contract, financIal, governdncc, lndu:-..lt'y dnd Intormdtli..m/lcldtion-,hrp charactcn..,Vc'i of the firln rh?",-c t..::,r" oHcr the oppprtUntty 10 eXdlllJilC The NSSBF data set mclude, data on the mtere,t rate paid on the firm's mo,t recent loan, which IS often dlawn under an LlC The ,urvey also gives informatIon on whether the loan was mdexed to the pnme and, If so, the premIUm over pnme (PREM) and whether It wa' fioatIng or fixed rate For purpme, ot th" analy"" the clcaneq data for loan-by-Ioan eompamon come, from U'Ing only fioatmg rate LlC loans that were IOdexed to the bank', pnme late 10 I he PREM results for the entIre ,ample are shown In table 3 The legressIOn In the fi"t column of the table exclude, the potentIally endogenou, loan contI act vanables for collateral, guarantee" and compen,atmg balance" and should be Viewed d' the reduced form for PR\:<.M The coefficICnts of the mcluded vanable, may be mterpreted as the effecb of the,e van abies on the rate, mclu"ve ot any predicted rate-reducmg effect of collateral, guarantees and compensating balances that they may Imply For example, the coeffiCient of LEV reprcsents the a%OCldtIOn between leverage and the rate on the loan after takmg IOtO account the expected values of collateral, guarantees, and compensatmg balance..., tlldt a margmal Increase 10 leverage Imphe<., Thus, the coefficient, of the firm charactenstlcs In column I can also bc IllterpreteJ as reflecting the a"oclatlon between these chardcteIlstIcs and the nsk of the loan, as reflected III Its prIce Column 2 of table 3 Includcs all of the varIables III the first column plus the collaterdl, guarantee, and compen,atIng halance contract varIahles The interpretatIOn of the bOilower and lelatlOnshlp charactcrlStiCS now reflect their effech on the plemlUm excludlllg theIr effccts through the contract terms 11 Thus, the coeffiCient, of the film charac- with the fixed-rate PREM bccau<;e (I) only the month ot the 10M' tdkedown 1"1 known and Tred,>ury fate,> often vaned con~lderdbly Within the month~ covered by our data set, (11) the repayment duration of the loan I" not known beeau~e the payment ~chedule IS not reported and becau,>e the callabllttv of commerl.ldllodn,> make ... the rrcpayment optiOn dlthcult to c\aluate and (Ill) the prune rdte which I" ... ubtractcd from our fiodtmg loan rates, J" kno\\-n to be ~tlckv lelatlve to Tred"lurv rates II A bJas could occur m e~tlmdtmg thIS equrltJon becduse the collateral, gUdrantce, and compemdtmg balance vafldblc"I ate endogenou"l to the hlln dnd reiatlOmillp chdrac~ teflstlc~ We d ...... ume d recur"lve model "Itructure here m which th..:: firm and relutlon,>hlp chdrdcten~tlcs explain the contract term ... up to random CHar., that ale not '>lgmficantly correlated WIth the PREM ellOf term OUI hndmg~ given JU"It below-that (I) the coefficlent<: of the contract term", m column 2 dre not ~lgmficantly different flom LCro dnd that (ll) their mciU5.lO!1 hd'> no matenal eftect 00 the coeffiC1ent~ of the other valldhle,,-ugge~t that no sub"tdotJai bidS IS pre"cnt .
~tdtl\tlcaliY ~lgmhlant at the ,q lc\Lt tv,o-tddcd tensllcs m column 2 can also be mterpreted as reflectmg the a"OClatIon between these charactenstIcs and the nsk of the borrower, as reflected m the loan pnce The regressIOns m columns I and 2 may also be vIewed as robustness checks on each other-we expect tbat If re1allonshlp effects are strong, they should be present m both equatIons The regressIOn m column 3 mcludes only the loan contract terms on the nght -hand sIde and will be discussed further below The most mterestmg results mcolumn I of table 3 are the Importance of the mformatIonirelatIOnshlp vanables, LNAGE and LNRELATE Both coeffiuents are negatIve, although the LNAGE coefficIent IS not staltsltcally slgmficant at standard confidence levels When thIs regresSIOn was rerun usmg levels m place of logs to measure the effects of AGE and RELATE (not shown), both coeffiCients were negative and stallsllcally slgmficant The negallve coeffiCients suggest that the older the firm IS m terms of current ownership and the longer the bankmg relatIOnshIp, the lower the rate on the loan (mcluslVe of any collateral and guarantee effects assocIated With these vanables) The RELATE results contrast sharply With those of Petersen and Rajan (1993,1994) , who found a posillve but mSlgmficant effect of RELATE on PREM mstead of our negatIve, slgmficant effect
We also mvestIgate whether the magmtudes of the measured AGE or RELATb effects on PREM are economically slgmficant The LN AG E coeffiCIent of about -14 suggests that, all else held equal, a small firm With an additIonal 10 yea" of bus mess expenence, II years versus I year, pays an expected 33 basIs pOints less on ItS LlC loans (I e , -14 x (In II -In I)) Slmtlariy, the LNRELATE coeffiCIent of about -20 suggests that a firm With an II-year bankmg re!allonshlp can expect to pay an L/C loan premIUm 48 baSIS pomts Ie" than a film that IS the same m every way except that It has only a I-year relatIonship Note that these figures are addillve, rather than mutually exclUSive, so that an II-year-old firm WIth an II-year bank-bOiTowcr relallonshlp can expect to pay about 81 baSIS pomts less than a I-yearold firm WIth a I-year relatIOnship In order to determme whether these changes m PREM are economically Important, we evaluate them m terms of our sample dlstnbutIon of the PREM vanabk 12 The sample denSIty of PREM (not shown) IS concentrated almost enllrely on values of PREM that are diVIsIble by 25 basIS pomts (I e , I 00%, I 25%, I 50%, etc) ThIS suggesb that banks group theIr borrowers mto pflcmg pools on the baSIS of fisk, relationship, and othel factors at 25-basIs-pomt mtervah Therefore the 33 baSIS pomt estimated AGE effect moves a firm more than a full pncmg pool, and the 48 baSIS pomt esllmated RELATE effect moves a firm about two full pncmg pools Moreover, 59 6% of the PREM To check robu"tness, we dl..,o eXdrJ1lTIcd the mdgOltudc" of the c~tt mdted effects u">mg three other spcclflcatlOn<.,---~econd ofdcl In the logs ot AGE dnd RELATE, hneal In the,r leveh, dud 'fcond order III the levels fhe ,econd-order equatlOll In k'g' adds the (erin' 112 LN AGE' 112 LNRELATE', and LNAGE x J NR~LATE, and 'lmllari y for the 'Gcond-order equdtiOn 1I1 levels rhe second-order equdtlons dllow the data morc [I eedom to choose the ... hdpe<" C't the curve" glvmg the marglOal effects of AGE and RELATE at dlffelcnt numbe" "fyeM, Incrcasmg AGE flOm I to II YCa!' while holdmg RcLA rE ,It .h sample medn vdlue, gives expected declines III PRE:M of66, 19, and 39 bd"S P<)lIlts f01 the three alterndtive -;peclf1uttron., n"'-Ipcctlvcl), a>; 0PP0'-lrd to the 33 ba~J'" pomt'-l for the model 'ihow'l In tbe text ~lmll:;1fly In(! Ctl:'log RE-LATE from 1 to II yea" "Iule holdmg AGE <It lh medn v,lluc lowe", PREM by predicted vdlues of 60, 21 dtld 29 b,'<I, 1'0mb, [c'pcellvely (a, oppo,ed to 48 baSIS pomt, for the lOb model) The'c aJd,t,ondl [C,ults ,ugge,t that our conciuswll that the meq,ulcd AGE dnd RPLATb effects are economledlly meaningful IS robust, dlthough the least ~rcfel red lIneal '-IprclficdtlOTI (which force'-l . -1. 11 yedr"j to have the "dme marglndl effect), Yield, notably ,mailer results 1 he coefficlcnh of most 01 the cont",1 Vdl lables In column I 01 t dble 3 are not '-ItdU'-ItIC<llly 5lgmficant 1 he exceptiOn'" dre CORP dlld SU BS, which .arc negative and statl5tKd.lly '-IlgDlfil-dn1 '-,uggc\tmg thclt loans to e!ther type of cOlpordlton tend to he sdier than OthCl 10dOS Most of the Vdlldblcs do have the predicted Slg''', dnd the mdgllltlldes of the eIght finaneldl Vdlldble, tdken together ,uggcsl that II all 01 these vdrldble'-l moved one "itd'ldard dCVldtIOil In the ritrcctIOr:. of grcdtel mk, PREM would Increa,e by 19 baSI' pomb rhlS movement In Ihe predicted dllection prOVides sume vcnficdtJOn of the model, de'-lplte the lack ot 5tatlstlcai Iflslgmficanl.c 'I he In~lgmfkctnce of Do"t of the contlol Vdlldbles could be a cono;;,cquence of low o;;tatl . . . . tlcal te'-lt power, given the large numbcr of pdr<1mcter" of the model relative to th(' hnllted number of ob..,cl YrltlOn'-l Another rotentldl I Cd,>on tor the InSlgmficance could bt-multlcolhnc.lflty MdflY of the 16 control vdlmbles, partIcularly the eight finane-wI vdfJ<lbk." dr,.:: Intended to proxy tOi borrower mk Each vdllablc cOllld InulVlductlly be In"8mfiCdnt, bllt the vanablcs a, a whole might be sIgnJficant However test, 0f the Jomt S1g111ficance of both the CL!!ht financ'dl Vd •• dbJc, togcthel dnd the 16 total control vdrIahle, togcthel could not reject the null hypotheSIS that they Jomtly have zcro dfect Perhaps the most likely .c,,,on that mo~t of the control V3lictblcs arc mSlgl1lfic-mt <int! thdt the R"! of the equatIon" relalively low I' that the pnemg of loan, to small bu,me;ses I' IdlO,yneratIe and often depends on the reputalion dnd credit of the busmess owners as much as or more than the reputalion and characterIStiC' of the firm Thl' I' dlsell"ed further below Whatever the reason for the low R2 and the general lack of stallslleal slgmficanee of the control vanable coefficlCnts, It does not deli act from our central result the relatIOnship van able " both statistically and economically slgmficdnt over d number of different speclfil-atlons
The second column III table 3 mcludes the contract va1!ables as well as all the firm and relatIOnship vanables from column I The AGE and RELATE effects are virtually unchanged from the pnor equatIOn rhe coefficients and I-,tallstlcs on LNAGE dnd LNRELA TE arc almost the same as earlier, so that only RELATE IS statistically slgmficant Once agam, however, both coefficient> were negallve and sta1ls1lcally ~Igmficant when thiS !egrc~~lOn \Va" rerun USing level'i m place of logs The RELATE result, m columns 1 and 2 of table 3--plus the vanous checkli of "tahstlcal "Igmficance economic 'ilgmf1cdnce, and robustness-strongly suggest a role for pllvate mformatlOn acqUired thl ough I datlOnshlp lendmg whel e mfO! mahan becomes aVailable only to the speCific lender through momtonng over time The AGE results are 'iOmewhdt weakel, given that the coeffiCients are not dlways stah:-.-1leally slgmficant, but they generally ,till support a role fOI reputatIOn, 01 publIcly available IlltolmatlOn, which becomes available over time to the lendmg commumty a, a whole n The RELATE I esults m columns 1 and 2 are conSistent with the thearclIcal models of Petersen and RaJan (1993) and Boot and Thakor (1994) They may also shed some lIght on the ambiguous results found In the Uniqueness event ~tlldle~ that have exammed the difference In announcement effect, between new LlCs and renewal LlCs These ,tudIes relIed on what may be d reldlIvely weak bmomIaI proxy for the stIength of the bank-borrower relatIonship-whether the Lie was new or d I enewa! Our methodology permit" a more revealing contmuous medsure of the relatIOnship ItS length U smg thIS medsure (RE-LATE), we find that the ,trength of the relatIOnship 1S an Important determtndnt of loan pr~cmg \3 It ,' > dho pO'>"lb1c that the RFLAl Ie, result", repre..,enl pubhe mformatlon to ,>orne degree If ditcrn,ltl\C lender~ ob~crve the length of the rCl<ltlOmhlp dod drc able to mfer that d longer cu'>h)mer l~ d beHel one, they IIl.lY Inake morc competitive offen. to borrO\\-er ... \\lth i<.tlger v<11uc.., of RFI ATF 1 he ]o\\-cr PREM d .. ..,OCldtcd With longer relatlOn~hlps could m paIi reflect the higher degree ot lompCtitlon among lender.:., for the<;e borrower" 1 hiS would be SLillllar to the lompCtltlve prace ... ., dc<;cnbed III (neenhaum et <1. 1 (19R9) (although they I e<lched the OpposIte conclu"'lOn regardmg the a..,..,ocmtlOn between PRI::.\1 ilnd RFI Alb) We do not however expect thiS pubhcreveiatlOn-ot-pnv<lte-1OformdtlOn t:llect to be PdltlCuLlrly ..,trong 10 our sdmpie of <;mall firms smce there IS h1tle In th~ way of pubhc pronouncements and oUhlde monJtonng for film,> of thiS <;lze
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We m.At deal with an nnre.,olvcd I~"lle 10 the colldteraJ t1tcldtllre~ the a"oelatlon, among collateral, borrower mk and loan mk Mo,t theO! etleal models of collateral demonstrale that collateral will be a"oclated With safer borrowers and loans (Bester 1985 , Besanko dnd 1 hdkor 1987a , 1987h, Chdn and Kdnata, 1987 , while others predict thdt mkler borrowers Will llIore often pledge collatelal (Swary and Udell 1988 , Boot, Tbakor, and Udell 1991 , Black and de MeLd 1992 Most of the empmcdl collaterdl IIteratUle supports the view that collateral IS associated With rIskier borrowers dnd loans (Orglcr 197(), He\ler 1979 , Scott dnd Smith 1986 , Berger and Udell 19'10, 1992 , Booth 1992 , 1993 These empmcal studies havc been hampered by a dealth of ddta soulees on the rISk characterIstic, ofllldlvidudl bon ower; and the lack of detdlled mformatlon on thc type at collateral pledged--ploblems that we can resolve With our detdlled borrowcr mfOlmatlon and two type, of collatcral
The legres"on III column, at table " which llldudcs only the loan contract telms on the rIght-hand sld~, te,ts the """elation hetween collateral and loan fISk The eollaterd tests presented later proVide some eVidence that secured LlCs dre associated With obsel vably llSkler borrowcr~ But thiS doce., not necessanly mean that secured loan~ are relatively n..,ky becau~e rccoUl..,C against colldtcral reduce" the ll~k of these loans, pOSSibly to levels below those of nnsecured 10al1' The results In column 3 of lable 3 show posilive coeffiCients on both types of collaterdl, indicating higher loan ratc, for securcd 10dllS, although nonc of the 'lope eoefficlCnts In thiS equdtlon arc stdtislically Significant either mdlvldually or JOintly, and the explandtOi y power of the regressors I' very low These results suggest thdt secured loans may be nsklCf thaD un"ccured loan~ ,l~ found In pIIor studie::... but the 3.%0-clatlOn l~ not very strong dnd there ,.., not suffiCIent test power to reject the null hypotheSIS of no ,tdlistleal ."ocratlOn TabJc~ 4 and 5 show the "lame lcgre'5'5lOn~ d.., In tdhlc 3, except that they are for fin", wllh dssels above and below ~500,OOO, respectrvely For firms With a"eis above $500 000 In table 4, the findIngs arc somewhat stronger than the findmgs for all firms m table 3 The LNAGE and LNRELATE coeffiCients ami i-stamtles are lalger and the R's are all hlghel In addition, In column 3 of tdble 4, the coefhclent of ARINV IS 35 and IS margmally statistically Significant ThiS suggest' that for firms With dssets above ~500,OOO, bcmg secured by accounts receivable and Inventory molY be an Important Indicator of higher loan n,k, for which the bank charge' dll addilIon.ll mk prunllim of dbont 35 ba'is pomts 14 The R' for thIS equation IS stili very low, h0wever, ~ Std!l~tlcally ~lgmhcan! at the !00" level two-taIled '"
"'* Stdtlstl,-dJ!) slgmficdnt at th(. "o/r le\c!, two-tdlled dnd a test of jomt "gO/ficance at "II the coeffiLlents could nol ,eject the null hypothesIS of dll zero, In contra';t to these .,tI onger rE.,ulh tor firp1'.. w'th d. ... .,eb above ~500,000, the regres"on, for hrms with a,,~t; below $500 000 In tdble 5 show much gredtel weakne" Only one "f the mdependent varmbles IS stat"lleally sigmiicant dnd the R2, are about hdlf of those for fillm WIth d"et' above $500,000 III table 4 Thl' suggests thdt the pnemg of bank JOdn~ to very "mall tlrmo;; I ... tclatlvcly IdIO':.yncrdtlc i hI", 111d.Y be the case because the reputatlOl1 dnd financld.1 dccount<-. of thr hu:,lOc,:>::. and of Its owners are often not econolll1cally sepdrdble for small famllyowned and -oper,lIed buslne"es LJ nfortunately, we lack the pe"onal data on the owners thdt mIght he used by the bank, 'l1ch a, their credIt ht.,tory and how long they may hdve had pcr"olldl rcldtlon"hlp~ With the bank This problem lIkely dffects ma,lY of the firms "11th a"els over $500,000 m our sample as well, and mdy help explaIn why, even In tables '\ dnd 4, the R 2 s are fdUly 10\1> and most of the control vallabies arc stdt"tlcally Inslgmficant IS Another rca,on why the AG£ dnd RELA'I E effect, may be mOl e difficult to estImatc for firms WIth assets below $'500,000 IS that these vandbles have smalier standard devIatiOns and are more highly correlated With edch other for the,e firms than for the subset With a"ets over ~500, OO() Overall the re'mlt~ ot the loan [;lte te,t ... ,uggc\1 that the bankborrower relatIOnship pldy~ an unpOi tant role In the pi ILmg of loans to smalt buslOe"es, wllh the possible exceptIOn of the vcry smdllest borrOWC1':l Our re~ulb are genclJ.lly con<.,l..,tcnt With the theoretIcal mode" of Petersen and Rajan (1993) dnd Boot dnd rhakor (1994) , both of which generate a negative assocldlJon betv¥ccn loan [dte":. dnd the length of the bank-borrower relatiOnship A~ noted above, It l~ our cotlJecture that our iOdll rcitc te',t rc~ult" dIffer from those of Petc"en and RdJan 11993 1994) "hI' l1se the same NSSBF ddta source, pnmdnly because of Ollr focus on lines of credit We mclude only LlC loan, dnd exclude 'transdc1lon-dnven" loans, such a<o; mortgages, eqUipment loan">, m0tor vehicle loan ... dnd other ~pot loan, To mve"-ltIgate thl"-l l~sue mOl c troroughly, we ccllculated "loyalty rattOs," which mdlcdtc how often bOirowcr;;; reu .. e the ~(Hnc bank f01 the same type of loan If what we call trdn'dctlon-dnven loan ... are actually rclatlOO"-lhlP dnvt"n then VvC would expect thJt firms WIth more than one of these 10dOS would almost dhvdY' have them at the ">drne hdnk In conlrd~t. If the~e loan ... eire generic bank product'; Without strong bank-bon ower tIe"-l, then fil 111'; With multiple lOath might often hdve them dt multiple institutIOns In the full NSSBF ,ample (mciudIng borrowers wllh dnd w·thm,t LlC,), we found that of 
All vanable::.
Terms Only
. . eon,ohdated at a smgle bank SImIlarly, eqlllpment loan, motor vehIcle loans, and other spot loan, had loyalty rat I'" of 508%, 52 3%, and 419%, respectIvely Thl", only about half or Ie" of the tlmc dId borrowe" WIth more than one loan ot a gIven type ha ve all of the same type at the same bank, sugge,tmg a lack ot loyalty that would be expected If these were relatlOn,hlp-dllven loan, Moreovel, when we group these four lypes of loans togethel, only 26 0% of borrower, with two or more of any of the,e type, at loan' had them concentrated at a smgle mslltutlOn By contra>t, ball owe", With Lie, demonstrated a hIgh degree of loyalty, supportmg our mtcrpretatlOn of the I /(' contract as a formahzatlOn of a lendmg relatIOnship Of all borrower, WIth Lies, 88 8% had them WIth only olle bank, thu, the,c bonowers almost alway, have thell multIple loans undel Lies eon,ol,dated dt a smgle mslltutlOn These figures prOVide support for the conJecture that our flndmg of a S1gmficant etfect of relatlOn,hlp lendmg on loan pnces dlffef5 from that of Petersen and RdJ3n (1993, 1994) .., MOIeover, the margmal effect of RELATE on PREM depends on a comhll1dtlon of two coefficlcnb m thiS equation but the \lgmfiCdt1CC of thl" combmalion was not lIIvestlgated Ihus, no other study to our knowledge has estabhshed a Imk between the length at the relalionsh[p and the 10dn rate
B Collateral 1 ests
In Older to determme whether collateral requrremenh are greater or lesser for borrowers WIth longer bankmg reldtl0I1shlP~, we u')c IOgIt models to examme the probabilIty of an Lie bemg SClll[ cd Recall that Boot and Thakor's (1994) model predIct, th"t collater,,1 will less often be pledged for borrowers with longer relatIOnships This predictIOn IS also consIStent wIth conventIOnal wisdom among bankers Unhke the loan mterest rate data analyzed above, data on collateral are available for all firms with LlCs, not Just those whose last loan was a floatmg-rate, pnme-based draw under an LlC Therefore, our sample sIze IS more than tWice as large for the collateralleglesslons than the PREM regressIOns above, that IS, 863 observatIons mstead of 371 The explanatory vanables agam Include the firm', financial, governance, and mdustry charactenstIcs, as well as the mformatlOn/ relatIOnship vanables The other contract vanables, GUAR and COMPBAL, are excluded from the nght-hand Side of these regressIOns because of the pOSSlblhty that the collateral, guarantee, and compensatmg balance decIsIons are codctermlOcd 16 Loglt regressIOns for the probablhty of any type of collateral bemg pledged (I e , prob(COLLAT) are shown In table 6 Column I shows the results usmg the entire data sample 17 The coeffiuents of the InformatIOn/relatIOnshIp vanables, LNAGE and LNRELA fE, arc both slgmficant and negatIve In thIS regressIOn Both were also negatIve and slgmficant when AGE and RELATE werc mcluded as levels 10 place of logs 18 As above for the loan rates, the magmtudes of these coefficients suggest that they are economIcally slgmficant 10 determmmg whether collateral IS pledgcd The LNAGE coefficient of about -19 suggests that, all else held equal, a small firm WIth II year; expcnence versus I year would have a probablhty of pledgmg collateral of about 12 percentage pOInts lower, from a mean probablhty of 53% to 41%, (I e , ] -19 x (In 11 -In I) = Inl 411(1 -41)]) Similarly, the LNRELATE coeffiCIent of about -26 suggests that an additIOnal 10 years of bank-borrower relatiOnshIp could lower the probablhty of 16 We eX.lmme thiS codetermm.ltton problem by .llso runmng ~ep.lratc collateral regressIOn"> on two wbseb ot the dat.l-Lle" With per~onal hdbIlIty ( ... orpor.ltlOns With a gUdrantee, ~ole propTietor<;hlp~, paJtnelshlp",) ver<;u.., those WIthout per~onaJ li.lbllltv (corporatIons Without a gUdfantee) The<;e .lddltlondlloglt regre<;<"IOn<> (not .,hown) . . . . ugge<;t that OUf re<.,ults reported below generdllv hold for both of theo;e groups and dre robust 17 In pnnclple, the prob(COLLAT) loglt regre"i';lOn could be c . Boot and Thakor (1994) and conventIOnal WIsdom As above for the PREM regre"lOns, thc coefficleuts of the control vanables are gencrally stallsllcally Inslgmficant, although most of the coefficIents have the predIcted SIgns rhe "mulatlOn of an mcreasc In IIsk by moving all the financIal variables one standard deVIatIOn m the directIOn of greater risk InCleases the pledlcted probabilIty of collateral bemg pledged as expected, provIding some venficatlOn of the specIficatIOn Columm 2 and 3 of table 6 show loglt regressIOns for prob(COL-LAT) uSing the subsamples of firms above and below $500,000 III assets, respectively [he coefficIents of the mformatlOn/relatlonshlp vanables are agalll negallve and of economIcally mcanmgful magmtudes However, the AGE coeffiCIent In the assets-above-$500,000 regressIOn and both the AGE and RELATE coetficlent> 10 the assetsbelow-$500,OOO regressIOn are not statIStically Slgmficant ThIS may at least paJ tly reflect a loss of statlSlJcal test power III the smaller subsampies As well, the explanatory power of the assets-bclow-$500,OOO regresSIon IS consIderably lowcr, presumably reflecting a findlllg that the terms of bank lendIng to very small firms are qUIte IdIosyncratic to the owner-manager and are not well explamed by our firm-level economIc vanables SImIlar results obtulIled fOl the speCIficatIOn III the levels of AGE and RELATE (not shown)
In table 7 the same loglt regreS>lOlls were run except that the dependent vanable IS the probabllrty that the loan IS secUied by accounh receIvable and/or mventory (ARlNV) The dec",oll to pledge thIS type of collateral, whIch reqUires IIltenslve monrtonng by the bank, may have dIfferent motIvations than pledgIng other collateral 19 The results for the InfOrmallon/relatlOnshlp vanables In table 7 all have the same negallve sIgns as were observed III table 6, and the coefficIents are generally of economIcally slgmficant magmtudes, although LNAGE loses ItS stat"tlcal Slgmficance III the full sample In the speCIficatIOn WIth levels of AGE and RELATE (not shown), the results are sImIlar, except that AG E I, statIStIcally "gmficant for the full sample and for the assets-over-~500,OOO subsample Thu" the collateral findrngs generally Imply that the older a firm" and the longel Its bankrng relatIonshIp, the less often It WIll pledge collateral (although the AGE effect IS not always ;tatlStrcally slgmfi- Sizes that banks produce pnvate mformatlOn about borrower quality (e g , Diamond 1984 , Ramaknshnan and Thakor 1984 , Boyd and Prescott 1986 Our empmeal results also suggest that banks accumulate Increasmg amounts of thl~ pnvate mformatlon over the duratIOn of the bank-bOl rower relatlOnsh[p and usc th" mformatlOn to refine their iOdn contract term\ In dudltion, our findmg\ dH, con . . . j.,tent with recent theoretIcal models of bank-bono we! relatlO~,hlps (Pekl ,en and Raj an 1993, Boot and Thakor 1994) although our resulh run counler to the predlclIons of other theoretIcal models (Greenbaum el al 1989 , Sharpe 1990 ThIS does not sugge't th"t one set of theones IS true and the other IS false -I athel that, on net thc Petersen and Rajan and Boot and Thakor models dpptal to have stronger effect; on loan contract tcrms than do the other modeh Our analysIS attempts to extend two strands 01 the (mplfleal literature that bear on relatIOnshIp lendIng questIOns ~tudle' of bank umqueness found that the ex"tencc of" bank-boll ower leldtlOnshlp mcreases firm value, and that the strength of the reldtlonshlp-as measured by the d"tmctlOn between the announcerrents of Lie rcnewdls versus newly Issued Lies-often generates mdrkct value as well The umqueness literature re.,ults are often ('onsl"otent with the notion th(lt bank .. acqUIre valuable prIvate mformatlon over thr cour.;;c of theIr lelatlOnshlps WIth mostly large, publicly trdded firm> Our study dIffers from these UnIquene" slUdlC' 111 three ImpOI tant way~ First, we foeu.., on "mall, mo~tly ulltradcd film.;; lather thein on large publicly traded firm, Small firms are genelally more dependent on banks and arc more likely to have the type of dsymmetnc mforillalIon problems that a hdnk-bOIrowcr relationshIp mdY I esolve Second, we use a contmuous measure of the strength of the bank-borrower relatIOnshIp, thdt IS, the length of lIme that the borrower h,,, conducted busme>s WIth lis current bank We believe that th" measure domInates the SImple bmomlal proxy of whethel the Lie was a renewal ve,"us a new ISSlle d~ d meal;)ure of the reJatJOo"hlP'.., ..,trength Thud, we are able to test directly the predictions of the le,ent lncoretlc,\1 Iiterdture about the path of loan mterest ratc.;; over the cour-:c of thL reldtlOn.;;hlp SImIlar to our andlysls, the ,econd strand of the cmpllIcdl lIterature on relatIonship lendmg foemed on small firms, used the contmuous length of the bank-borrowel relatlOn~hlp do;, ,t mc-aSUfC of 11\ .,trength, and tested the path of loan mtere,t rdtc, over the COllr'" of the relatlOn-'hIp (Petersen and R'U.m 1993, 1994) However an Impm!ant dltterencc from our study IS that thl<" ~econd >;trand \.)f stmile>; did not (.onfine theJl1~elves to Lie IOdn:, Wc focus on hdnk Iinc,", of credit only, excludmg from OUI data ~et loan., thdt dre pnmanly tr dO\dctJOn-dnvcn, rdthcr than reldtIOn::-,hlp-dnvcn Our exclUSIOn of trdn~dctlOn-dnven loan.,-such .1\ mortgdges, cqUJpmcnt 10(Hl<;, motor vehIcle loan.;;, and other spot loans that ,mall firms often ohtaIn from multIple bonk ,--may aVOId dliutmg our relationshIp lendmg re<;ult<; and fitly explain why our re'liits concernmg the pI iClIl!! at bank loan, dlfter trom thIS second strand of empmcal hter,lturc Our study also dIffers flOm both strdnds of the emplrIcdl I,klature m that It andlyzes the a"ocmltoo between the pledgmg ot collateral ~~~"~,~~,_,,JC..JQ:lIp~y,!lJrig,gblJJt~©d.L20D1, All Rights Reseved, and the bank-borrower relatIOnshIp The relatIonshIp lendmg model of Boot and Thakor (1994) , as well as conventIonal wIsdom m bankmg, emphasIze the role of collateral m the evolutIon of the bank-borrower relatIOnshIp Our empIrIcal result that collateral IS less often pledged m a mature relatIOnshIp IS consIstent WIth the predIctIons of Boot and Thakor and conventIOnal WIsdom Our findmgs may .lIsa help clanfy some of the Issues m the collateral lIterature by controllmg for more types of collateral and more firm charactemtlcs than were preVIOusly aVaIlable The collateral findmgs are aha consIstent WIth the loan rate findlOgs-m both cases, borrowers WIth longer relatIOnshIp, receIve eaSIer loan tenns from theIr bdnks (lower rates, fewer collateral reqUIrements) Fmally, our findlOg thdt bank-borrower reldtIonshlps have value may have some polIcy ImplIcatIon, about the future of the bankmg mdustry FIrst, relatIOnshIp lendlOg may help lImIt the so-called "declIne of banklOg," m whIch seCUrItIzatIOn dnd nonbank competItIon are reduc-109 the share of loans held by banks Our results suggest that the Impact of these trends on small busme'5 lendmg may be lImIted beCduse of the value of relatIOnshIps aSSOCIated WIth bank lendlOg Second, our results suggest that bank faIlures may create a loss of value m excess of the book value of the bank-the addItIonal loss of the relatIOnshIps Research on both the Great DepressIOn (Bernanke 1983 ) and a recent bank faIlure (SlovlO, Sushkd, and Polonchek 1993) verIfy these losses Lastly, bank faIlures may create "credIt crunches," or reductIons 10 the supply of credIt for small borrowers, wbo may face hIgher loan rates and more collateral reqUIrements If a bank WIth whIch they had an establIshed relatIonshIp faIls
